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Amateur Aesthetics as State
Narrative in Iranian Martyrdom
Talinn Grigor
The rise of the middle-class bourgeoisie in Iran has been, by and large,
credited to the secularist and modernist ruling ambitions of the founder
of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah, who reigned between 1925 and
1941. Modern architecture in the capital city, Tehran, and in other
major urban centres throughout the country consisted of the most vivid
expression of this shift from a Qajar aristocratic to a bourgeois ascen-
dancy in the 1920s and 1930s. The formation of the architectural pro-
fession as a separate discipline and vocation – hence the inception of the
local architect as the paramount representative of the bourgeois class –
was a result of the modernising and secularist policies of the early
Pahlavi era, which was instituted by the king’s reformist ministers in his
first cabinet. Many of them had long been a part of the revolutionary
movement that brought about the first constitutional revolution in the
Muslim world and in 1922 formed the Society for the National Heritage
of Iran (SNH) that delineated major cultural policies and practices. Young
Iranians were sent to Europe on state scholarship – primarily to the École
des Beaux-Arts – to return in the 1930s and erected the built environment
of the New Iran on avant-garde and modernist architecture principles. A
dialectical relationship then developed between individual architects at the
service of the secular state and the centralist state that founded institutions
with the aim of producing the professional middle class, which included
these same professional architects.
As the protagonists of the modern middle class, Iranian architects often
found themselves in the precarious position between a heavy-handed gov-
ernment – with which they often shared ideological views on progress and
methods of implementation – and their own avant-garde spirit to practice
without authoritarian interference. While relying on state patronage for
public projects, they tried to maintain distance by developing an architec-
tural discourse that divorced their craft from political plots and intrigues.
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As with Congrès internationaux d’architecture moderne (CIAM) and
Bauhaus, they designed in the International Style (as did Vartan Hovanes-
sian in his Girls’ Art Academy, 1938) and constantly reinforced the notion
that they had nothing to do with politics. In the very first editorial of the
first Iranian architectural journal, Iraj Moshiri proclaimed in September
1946, ‘The Architecte is purely a technological and aesthetic publication,
which cannot and does not wish to have the slightest involvement with the
world of politics.’1 This ambivalent position of architects was crucial to
the survival of the architectural profession as an independent practice; it
was pivotal not only to their livelihood, but also to the nation-building
project which took place from 1925 to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
When, in June 1978, Empress Farah Pahlavi (1959–1979) decreed the
allocation of $2 million for the squatters of southern Tehran, it was
already too late. Any subsequent attempt to stop a revolution through
architecture, as Le Corbusier had prophesied in his modernist call ‘Archi-
tecture or Revolution’, ended in failure. Not only had the people chosen
revolution over architecture, but they had co-opted architecture in their
revolution. The March 1979 referendum and the 1980 constitution estab-
lished the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the auspices of the new theo-
cratic state, revolutionary art – or rather the pictorial replacement of
‘royalist avant-garde’ (itself a contradiction) art with ‘Islamic’ icons and
signs – was conceived to remove the secular and modernist cultural
environment established by the Pahlavi reformists in the 1920s.2 It also
aimed to solve a theoretical predicament that the new theocratic republic
faced. The purpose of this propaganda art catered to the ideological
dilemma of the political system that governed it: that the raison d’être
of the official religion of Iran, Shi’ism, was advocacy for the oppressed
in a state of opposition. From the outset, the leadership of the revolution
recognised that the Islamic Republic needed to produce an environment
wherein the legitimacy of a religious republic would be perpetuated. The
creation of a certain anti-elitist, anti-avant-garde visual culture thereby
became pivotal to the preservation of the post-revolutionary status quo.
Amateur art was to become the official state aesthetic.
The Hegemony of Amateurism
In 1982 the state launched and maintained a firm command on its self-
representation, and on the politics of pictorial replacement through the
development of a populist visual environment during the Cultural
Revolution. The very process of this development was amateurish
due to the fact that the Pahlavi dynasty had, by the late 1970s,
fully succeeded in merging the image of avant-garde art with the
ethos of the reigning dynasty. When the revolutionary momentum
began, the Iranian avant-garde, with a few sporadic exceptions in
poster design, was unable to muster a dissenting philosophy of its
own. Nor did Empress Farah Pahlavi’s personal commitment and gen-
erous patronage of both Western and Iranian avant-garde art help the
revolutionary intentions of artists. Throughout 1978, when the intelli-
gentsia, students, clerics and professional middle class rose against the
monarchy, the avant-garde’s time had passed. With a handful of
exceptions, well-known artists followed the royal family into exile.
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2 See Talinn Grigor, Building
Iran: Modernism,
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Heritage under the Pahlavi
Monarchs, Periscope,
New York, 2009
Art students and amateur artists rapidly filled the gap left by accom-
plished artists. Experimental art, or rather art created by non-trained
and non-credentialed non-artists, was adopted by the early revolution-
ary authorities. The new post-revolutionary state, the first theocratic
republic, itself could be described as a by-product of amateurs’ bid
on a utopian society.
In line with Michel Foucault’s short-sighted praise of Iran’s spiritual
yet modern revolution, these amateur artists began to synthesise classi-
cal revolutionary styles from Mexico, Russia, Cuba and China with
Islamic iconography.3 Eight years of brutal war with Iraq further
reinforced the official status of this populist art. The tension between
‘Islamic’ and ‘republic’ is not only reflected in policies towards the
arts, but also remains a major structural debate among the leadership
and the people of Iran. As cultural historian Shiva Balaghi notes, the
‘people’s authorship over their cultural destiny’ guaranteed by the
1980 constitution on the one hand, and the resolve to ‘use culture to
promote an Islamic morality’ on the other, lingers at the core of the
contradiction within an Islamic republic.4
During the 1980s, the state produced a pictorial discourse that aimed
to (re)acculturate the masses based on Shi’a-Iranian moral principles. The
formulaic reproduction of extant styles, the sentimental appeal to
emotions, and the didactic purpose assigned to art, formed a separate aes-
thetic and ethical system that set itself apart from and against the art pro-
moted by the ousted Pahlavi dynasty. The art that the revolutionaries
reacted to was characterised by the Western-oriented, Tehran-centred
modernist and vernacular movements of the 1960s and 1970s that went
hand in hand with the secularist, individualist and nationalist ideological
of the Ancien Régime. The revolution and the eight-year Iran-Iraq War
(1980–1988), led by Imam Khomeini, gave rise to a new visual environ-
ment that aimed to cleanse (pak-sazi) the monarchical and Western tra-
ditions. It also attempted to create an Islamic community (Persian
ommat, Arabic umma) through a synthesis of Shi’a signs and narrative
with revolutionary iconographic traditions.
The brutality of the war amplified art’s presumed truth-telling role
within the ideological discourse of the state. The hardship endured by
ordinary Iranians during the war brought much disappointment after
the promises of the revolution. Street art had to convince many of the
merit of continual fate in the republic. Because of its presumed authen-
ticity, the more amateur looking, the more persuasive. Photography and
filmmaking were immediately put at the service of the war effort. In the
international diplomatic circles wherein most had a finger pointing at
Iran, these photographs bore witness to Saddam Hussein’s pillage. To
a sceptical West, they proved that Iraq was using chemical weapons
on civilian targets. Many of these images were captured by amateur
photographers. Soldiers who later died on the frontline were given
cameras by the state to expose the hypocrisy and double standards of
the international community. Many of these photographs were later
to become objects displayed in the Martyr’s Museum. Documentary
photography, although amateur – or one might say, because amateur,
spontaneous and unstaged – was to save the integrity of the Islamic
Republic within the community of nations and to bolster the domestic
culture of martyrdom.
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The trauma of the war was exacerbated by Khomeini’s passing in June
1989. In an impromptu outburst of grief, millions poured onto the streets.
None of the Pahlavi kings had enjoyed such popular reverence. The imam
had led an austere and disciplined life. To ensure the continual existence of
his Islamic republic, his successors betrayed this asceticism with a sumptuous
mausoleum. The choice of the site was self-evident. The lay religious thinker
and sociologist Ali Shariati popularised the post-revolutionary discourse on
Shi’a martyrdom in the late 1960s. This tradition was cemented in a real
place when, on arrival at Tehran, Khomeini had asked to be taken to the
Behesht-e Zahra cemetery in Ray, in the south of Tehran. ‘In his time,
only the cemeteries prospered,’ he had declared referring to Mohammad
Reza Shah’s reign, and stated ‘the country itself, he destroyed.’5 The imam
could not have known that under his guardianship Behest-e Zahra would
grow to become Iran’s largest burial ground. Divided into sections allocated
to martyrs of the revolution, martyrs of the war, relatives of martyrs and
non-martyr-related deaths, the cemetery is a manifestation of the state
effort to regulate Iranian society and render it functional. At the entrance,
the visitor is met by the enlarged amateur photograph of a dead solider.
Behesht-e Zahra was cast as the epicentre of this populist solidarity. The
master plan of the 434-hectare hexagon is designed so that its northern tip
connects the historic cemetery to the funerary complex of Khomeini. Care-
fully numbered and colour-coded, it is conceived as an ideal city. In keeping
with its namesake, Behesht-e Zahra refers to the paradise of ImamHusayn’s
mother andwife of ImamAli, Fatima Zahra. Designed on a regular grid, the
plan is punctuated by squares, memorial monuments, amenities, and foun-
tains, including the Blood Fountain cascading red-coloured water down
Photograph of a poster at the cemetery of a dead soldier during the Iran-Iraq War, taken by
amateur-soldier photographer and displayed at the Museum of Martyrdom, Shemiran,
Tehran, photo: courtesy of the author
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several levels, symbolising the blood of the martyrs. The collection of tightly
knitted graves acts as an open-air, DIY memorial museum. Loved ones –
largely female relatives of martyrs – curate the glass-fronted cupboard on
top of each tombstone. The glass-fronted metal cases are uniform and
seem to be mass-produced by the Tehran Municipality for this exact
purpose. In them, all sorts of personal, official and practical objects are
exhibited. Photographs, copies of the Quran, plastic flowers, the national
flag, wrapping paper, certificates and other symbolic artefacts are arranged.
In one case, the national flag is displayed with great affection, but upside
down, which might speak to the less privileged educational level of its
maker. Often with scrupulous care, they espouse the populist taste endorsed
by the state, which has co-opted the people’s desire for memorialisation.
There certainly exists an alliance between the state strategy of populist aes-
thetic and these very personal, intimate amateur curations of female narra-
tives of sons lost.
While Tehran Municipality manages Behesht-e Zahra, Imam Khomei-
ni’s main complex was sponsored by the state who commissioned archi-
tect Mohammad Tehrani, and ran by the imam’s family since erection.6
Through its architectural pastiche of medieval and postmodern forms
(ie, neo-Timurid domes and minarets juxtaposed with contemporary pyr-
amidal volumes), materials (ie, poured reinforced concrete, longitudinal
steel trussing, multi-glazed tilling, gold-gilding) and diverse programming
(religious, educational, commercial, etc), the public and the private are
blurred. The spiritual is drawn into the domain of politics: mourning inter-
sects with leisure; pilgrimage with window-shopping; and family outing
with prayer. Shi’a religious pilgrimage, ziarat (or ziyarat), much fostered
by the state, is enhanced with marketing strategies: shopping malls, free
phone lines, drinking fountains, picnics and air-conditioning in a
relaxed yet monitored atmosphere. The architecture projects a sense of
One of the wings of Imam Khomeini’s mausoleum complex during the long process of con-
struction, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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World 20, 2003, pp 209–224
futuristic traditionalism. A must-see landmark during diplomatic visits, it
projects an image of legitimacy and power for the Islamic Republic. To the
outside world, Imam Khomeini’s life and death were sensationalised in
Western media through the mausoleum’s pastiche.7 Western journalists
wrote about the fusion of the old and the new, of the religious and the con-
temporary, and of the communal and the individual. The Blood Fountain,
with its fake red liquid, was of particular interest.8 Architecture was
deployed to reinforce differences. While Mohammad Reza Shah ruled
the country (1941–1979) from his modernist White Palace in northern
Tehran, the Islamic Republic looms large from the paradise of Zahra.
While the tomb’s plastic bouquets, prefabricated decorations and building
materials might convey Imam Khomeini’s ‘anti-elitist availability’, the
amateur style witnessed here is a part of the larger representational repla-
cement. The repetition of the same forms, colours and materials in street
art, museums, architecture and urbanism, and a persistent official
appeal to populist taste is indicative of a wider cultural agenda divorced
from the venerated figure of Imam Khomeini.
The Kitsch of the Beautiful
Under the presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad
Khatami, the Second Republic from 1989 to 2005 saw the rise of the conser-
vative bazaar as the ruling elite of the ‘mercantile bourgeois republic’.9
Graves of soldiers who fought in the Iran-IraqWar, with metal casing decorated by female relatives of the buried, Behesht-e
Zahra Cemetery, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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The enormous wealth amassed by the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazen
(Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled) as well as other such ‘religious
foundation-cum-conglomeration… epitomized the ascendancy of the mer-
cantile bourgeoisie and its dominance over the country’s economy’.10 In
1982, Imam Khomeini had described them as an ‘essential pillar of the
society’.11 Since then, they had been waiting to reap the benefits of the revo-
lution. Commodity fetishism (re)-entered the Islamic Republic. While the
Pahlavi capitalist professionals upheld the foreign economic interests and
avant-garde taste dear to its class identity, the mercantile bourgeois whowel-
comed European business investments differentiated their rise by the hege-
mony of street art.12 ‘The Pahlavi monarchy had returned,’ writes
historian Ali Ansari, ‘albeit with different actors and an indigenous bour-
geoisie.’13 This return was predicated not only on change in agency, but,
above all, on a sharp difference in taste that legitimised their ascendancy.
In his Portrait of a Lady (2004), for instance, photographer Kaveh
Kazemi captured two well-dressed members of the mercantile bourgeoisie
who examine a carpet tableau in the Tehran bazaar. This new type of
carpet art – which mingles famous Western and Iranian imageries from
Persepolis reliefs to Mona Lisa portraits – was reproduced by women or
girls trained outside any fine arts academies and became fashionable
among the mercantile class.
To the mercantile bourgeoisie who financed the Second Republic,
amateur art had a particular appeal. Acting as its patron, the mercantile
Enlarged photograph of a dead solider from the Iran-Iraq War at the entrance of Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery, Ray, photo:
courtesy of the author
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Two Revolutions,
Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1982, p 530.
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p 59
bourgeoisie deployed populist art to distinguish itself from its equally capi-
talist and oligarchic Pahlavi predecessor. In contrast to the avant-garde of
the 1960s and 1970s, they chose a certain populist kitsch that projected a
fitting picture of its populist background and practices of sociability – not
necessarily executed by amateur artists exclusively, but certainly having
the appearance of the amateur and kitsch. This art, in turn, articulated
and normalised a coherent vision of otherwise contradictory new
agendas: the mercantile bourgeoisie’s insistence on conformity, despite
its newfound wealth and power; the state’s resolve to institutionalise
power and stabilise life under the Second Republic while continuing to
create ‘the Islamic man’ on orthodox Shi’a ideals; and the constitutional
commitment to private property within the increasingly centralised for-
mations of the nation-state. The potential for class conflict caused by
this shift was ‘displaced onto relations among things’ through a new
ethos of amateurist art and mass consumption. For Walter Benjamin,
this ‘cluttered “kitsch”’ was predicated on ‘the overproduction of com-
modities’ that deferred the dream of the revolution onto consumer fetish-
ism and urban renewal.14
The state went further in exchanging martyrs with war veterans in the
pictorial discourse. Instead of mere replacement, it aimed to historicise
the war. Street art moved into the museum. While the Shahadat (martyr)
Museum at Behesht-e Zahra cemetery commemorates the culture of self-
sacrifice, the Shohada (Martyrs) Museum in Chizar, northern Tehran, is
Map of Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery displayed at the cemetery showing the location of the sections as well as Imam Khomei-
ni’s mausoleum complex on the upper left, Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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14 Benjamin, quoted in Susan
Buck-Morss, The Dialectics
of Seeing: Walter Benjamin
and the Arcades Project,
The MIT Press, Cambridge,
1989, pp 283–284
A memorial monument at the intersection of grave sections, Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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dedicated to the martyrs of the Tehran province.15 Opened in 1997 under
the directorship of Morteza Alizadeh, the display typifies the populist taste
of much of the street art that has now been co-opted by the museum system.
At its founding, Alizadeh saw the museum as a demonstration of all that has
been sacrificed for Islam and Iran. For him the museum was a means to
transfer the venerated status of martyrdom in Shi’ism from ‘the old’ to
A display case above the martyr of the Iran-Iraq War, decorated by a female relative of the
soldier with various objects including an upside-down Iranian flag, Behesht-e Zahra Ceme-
tery, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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15 See documentary, Roxanne
Varzi, Plastic Flowers
Never Die, colour, 34
minutes, 2008
The fountain with the panjeh, the remains of a martyr under a display case, and other display cases, Museum of Martyrdom,
1997, Chizar, Shemiran, northern Tehran, photo: courtesy of the author
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‘the new generation’.16 As a renewed expression of the official populist art,
the museum serves to tie the state to the people, promoting an interest in the
war, in the culture of martyrdom, and to hence appeal to religious-nation-
alism. Access to the museum is through the courtyard where war veterans
are buried. On entering the extensive hall of the museum itself, large and
small glass cases display a range of paintings, photographs, banners, per-
sonal items such as binoculars, blood-stained cloth, pocketsize Qurans,
broken eyeglasses, worn-out guns, photos of loved ones, etc. The four
corners of the hall are further enshrined with theatrical displays.
On the far corner, a scene from the Battle of Karbala (10 Muharram 61
AH–October 680 AD) stages the martyrdom of Imam Husayn next to his
wounded horse, Zuljanah. It bleeds and weeps for him as recounted in
the Hadith. To the right of the entrance, a symbolic sculptural painting
depicts the struggle of good and evil through the interaction of a tulip
and a serpent. To the left of the entrance, a martyr’s water fountain is
flanked by a massive panjeh, the Shi’a hand standard. Behind the panjeh,
life-size paintings of historical and allegorical figures decorate the walls.
While enlarged plastic tulips and potted plastic flowers decorate the front
of the fountain, here stands a prominent glass display case with a neon-
green plastic base. A closer look reveals the actual remains of a soldier.
The pictorial replacement goes beyond its own strategies: representation
is replaced by reality itself, which in the context of the museum renders
the representational impact of that reality far more effective.
Down the hall, a tomb-display with a helmet, a water-cooler andQurans
soaked in blood concludes the visual simulation of martyrdom. It replicates
Umberto Eco’s notion of ‘the authentic fake’.17 The tomb is not a tomb, for it
shelters no corpse, but rather a vivid simulation of a tomb. Nor is the red-
painted, dripping blood real. Yet, the culmination of the visitor’s experience
generates real feelings of sympathy and compassion. The décor collides with
one’s proximity to real and fake bones as if to mend the gap created by the
transport of martyrdom into the museum. With the exception of school
groups and the occasional tourist, it is quiet. For thosewho have experienced
martyrdomby proxy, the relatives ofmartyrs, they do not need themuseum.
For those who have not, it is ‘no longer a question of imitation… nor even of
parody’, as Jean Baudrillard puts it.18 It is about ‘substituting the signs of the
real for the real itself; that is, an operation to deter every real process by its
operational double’. This sense of perplexity is exacerbated by the
museum’s gift-shop adjoining the panjeh fountain. Under a glass counter,
it offers the visitor Imam Khomeini stickers, Imam Ali pin buttons, Imam
Husayn dog tags, glossy war posters and other memorabilia honouring
Shi’a martyrdom in the form of capitalism. This, in effect, belongs to a
global phenomenon of pilgrimage memorabilia: bright green panelling,
neon lights, plastic flowers and plants, personal belongings, wallet-size pic-
tures of children and enlarged photographs of bloody, dead soldiers are care-
fully curated to convey the reality of war. The museum embodies
Baudrillard’s hyperreal, ‘apanic-strickenproductionof the real and the refer-
ential, above and parallel to the panic of material production’.19
Despite the state’s flooding of the public space on the merits of
martyrdom by means of these largely amateur homages, trained artists
acted as gauges to social consciousness, by preserving the memory of
the war’s collective trauma. In the excitement of the reconstruction and
the beautification of the 1990s and 2000s, many artworks, such as
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Khosrow Hassanzadeh’s ‘War’ series (1995–1998), Arash Hanaei’s
Benefits of Vegetarianism (2004), Hossein Khosrojerdi’s Eternal Rest
(2005), and Shadi Ghadirian’s ‘Nil, Nil’ series (2008) reminded their audi-
ence of the lingering consequences of the conflict. Newsha Tavakolian’s
powerful ‘Mother of Martyrs’ photo series (2006) brought her audience
face to face with survivors who continue to bear witness to the war’s vio-
lence.20 Her photographs of the martyrs’ mothers holding the portraits of
their sons some three decades after their death loops back to another
endless continuum, the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, wherein these same
women act as artists in creating the display cases for the memory of
their sons. Nowhere is the absurdity of normalcy more clearly rendered
visible, and nowhere are the margins between the high and the low so
blurred. Through the painstaking process of curating these mini-
museums, women, particularly disenfranchised women acting as
amateur artists, enter the narrative of the war. Portraits of martyrs –
several of which have been reproduced on official murals and on state-
issued portraits of the Supreme Leader – small Qurans, fake flowers,
flower pots and other personal object decorate these display cases. Has-
sanzadeh’s Takhti from his ‘Ready to Order’ series (2007–2008) takes
its aesthetic cue from the cases. Gholamreza Takhti (1930–1968) was
the most popular wrestling champion in Iran, having won both an
Olympic gold medal and a world championship. He was politically
active for the National Front Party. Although he probably committed
suicide, his early death has been blamed on the king’s secret police, the
SAVAK. Takhti is an exemplar of the porousness of the street and the
studio, facilitated by President Mohammad Khatami’s liberal policies
during his tenure from 1997 to 2005, premised on the inclusion of
artists and the artworld as agents of socio-political reform.
Holding a bouquet of daffodils in one hand and a vase of plastic
flowers in the other, the author of bestseller Reading Lolita in Tehran:
Women, mothers or sisters of war martyrs, visiting and washing graves at Behesht-e Zahra
Cemetery, Ray, photo: courtesy of the author
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AMemoir in Books (2003), Azar Nafisi, had asked her students at Tehran
University, ‘What is kitsch?’21I conjecture upon Nafisi’s reason for asking
that question and wonder about her students’ answers. Could it have
something to do with the street art to which Nafisi and her students had
been exposed during the first decade after the Iranian Revolution?
Could it have something to do with Behesht-e Zahra or the murals and
Khosrow Hassanzadeh, Pahlavan II, Ready to Order, 2008, mixed-media box, Los Angeles
County Museum of Art, in the exhibition ‘In the Fields of Empty Days: The Intersection of
Past and Present in Iranian Art’, 6 May 2018–9 September 2018, photo: courtesy of the
author
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billboards that avowed, ‘God is beautiful and [he] loves beauty’? Under
these inscriptions, one often found illustrations of bouquets of red tulips
or pink roses. What has this to do with the history of contemporary
Iranian art? There are no plastic flowers in Immanuel Kant’s analysis of
aesthetic judgment, because the first man-made plastic was displayed at
the Great Exhibition, London, as late as 1862. However, Kant does
mention ‘artificial flowers’.22 To tie Kant to Nafisi via artificial flowers
that are termed ‘kitsch’ would be an anachronism, for the word kitsch is
a nineteenth-century invention. Moreover, Kant applies the adjective
vanity to his artificial examples, which might not be a bad approximation
of our own fake flowers. Kant’s analysis of the intellectual interest in the
beautiful reveals a correlation between the reproduction of fake roses on
official billboards and the state that has taken upon itself to be the moral
guide of that same society.
In his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant writes, ‘Suppose we had
secretly played a trick on this lover of the beautiful, sticking in the ground
artificial flowers’, adding, ‘The direct interest he took in these things [wild
flowers] would promptly vanish, though perhaps it would’ – and this is
where I am interested in elaborating on the point – ‘be replaced by a different
interest, an interest of vanity, to use these things to decorate his room for the
eyes of others’.23 An ethical system, like the Islamic Republic that upholds a
moral responsibility in its governance of the people, gives birth to an aesthetic
of populist street art. ‘An ethical system cannot do without conventions,’ as
Hermann Broch argued in 1950, adding, ‘the man who sticks to it is inevita-
bly constrained… to aestheticize his tasks and to transform them into works
of art which correspond to convention’.24 In order to validate its ethical obli-
gation, kitsch then strives to produce the effect of the beautiful. Within this
system, then, the arts of propaganda are collective and appeal to the emotions
of the onlooker.
Election campaign banner stating ‘Youth, come aboard/Mir Hosayn Musavi’, 8 June 2009,
Vali Asr Avenue, Tehran, photo: courtesy of the author
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The official, state appeal to god’s love of beauty was also co-opted into
narratives of the Green Movement in the summer of 2009, including the
popular uprising that followed the rigged presidential election that June.
A poster, photographed as it is being held in the hands of a campaigner
on the eve of the election, depicts what seems to refer to Michelangelo’s
fresco, The Creation of Adam (c 1508–1512), in the Sistine Chapel. Sub-
verting gender representations, the hands of God and Adam are substi-
tuted with female hands that sport green bands on their wrists. The
green calligraphy reads, ‘Youth, come aboard / Mir Hosayn Musavi’.
This cross-border appeal to divine beauty is embedded in and informed
by multiple narratives, both theological and art historical – from the
Quranic reference to god’s love of beauty, to the Christian depiction of
divine beauty in the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, to the modern practice
of voting.
The combination of the green-stained fingertips of the election banner
held by a campaigner with her meticulously French-manicured nails
speaks to Nicholas Mirzoeff’s claim that ‘visual culture does not depend
on pictures themselves but the modern tendency to picture or visualize
existence’.25 In Iran’s case, it is not just about visualising one’s own
culture and history, but rather of appropriating the other’s as a postmo-
dern act of distinction and belonging. The iconographic contradiction,
(con)fusion and appropriation are multi-layered and deeply meaningful:
the green colour of Prophet Mohammed and Musavi’s campaign, the
green fingerprints of the most classical signifier of democratic election,
the ring on one finger that places the image in a local context, the impli-
cation of a divinely ordained election, the implication that youth are
joining a movement beyond simple bureaucratic procedures, etc. These
are encapsulated in one hybridised image that embraces the West in its
own orbit of signs and signifiers and makes it her amateur own.
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